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The Nature of Global Commitments and
Obligations: Limits on State Sovereignty in the Area
of Asylum
HEATHER A. LEARY*
INTRODUCTION
The plight of the refugee is global in nature, but the alleviation of this
plight requires individual states to meet their commitments to international
treaties. The nature of this commitment, however, is complex because of the
ever present issue of state sovereignty. One area of traditional and well-
established national power is that of states to limit the number of persons who
will enter their country and the number of persons who will qualify for
benefits. At some point, however, creating limits on refugees and asylum
seekers may compromise international commitments. This note focuses on
one numerical limitation that may compromise the ability of the United States
to fulfill its commitment to the refugee.
The United States amended the Immigration and National Interest Act with
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IRIRA).
This amendment changes the law to allow persons persecuted under coercive
family planning policies to qualify for refugee or asylum status.' Congress
specifically targeted a group of persons and made an affirmative commitment
to consider their claims. The legislation, however, contains a stipulation that
is unique to immigration law; it limits the number of persons2 who can
* J.D., 1998, Indiana University School of Law, Bloomington; B.A., 1995, Indiana University,
Bloomington
I. Illegal Immigration Reform and National Interest Act (IIRIRA) § 501, 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(42)
(1997) (amending Immigration and Nationality Act § 208, 8 U.S.C. §1 101(aX42)). Any alien present in
the United States may apply for asylum status. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(aX1).
2. The number of refugees who may gain refugee status, which is defined as those refugees who apply
for entry into the United States before they leave their nation or a third nation, is limited to 50,000 per fiscal
year. 8 C.F.R. § 207.1 (1997). There is no corresponding limitation to the number of persons who may be
granted asylum status. See 8 U.S.C. § 1558. The number of refugees or asylees who may get their status
adjusted to permanent resident is limited to 10,000 per fiscal year. 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b).
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successfully gain refugee or asylum status' for persecution under coercive
family planning policies to one thousand."
The IIRIRA provides a useful example for thinking about the nature of
nations' commitments to refugees and asylum seekers. With increasing
concerns about the numbers of immigrants and refugees from war-torn
countries, it is important to analyze the way in which we should limit the
number of persons who can claim refugee or asylum status. The question that
follows is whether it is possible to limit state sovereignty by limiting state
discretion concerning who should and should not be admitted.
There may be some benefits to the type of numerical limitation in the
IIRIRA.5 Policies enforcing numerical limitations may encourage countries
to expand traditional definitions of asylum and allow persons to gain asylum
status under unique circumstances. Also, these policies may help a country
"protect themselves against what they regard as threats to their security,
economic well-being, political stability and cultural identity."6 These may or
may not be desirable goals. Even if they are worthy ends, however, their
means are in conflict with international commitments to alleviate the plight of
the refugee. Nations volunteered to maintain their commitments regardless of
how narrowly they interpret the domestic laws. Considering the increasing
global nature of our commitments, this note proposes that the numerical
limitation exemplified by the IRIRA is not consistent with our international
commitments.
The first part of this note briefly examines the legal frameworks within
which our discussion will take place. It discusses both the basic structure of
international treaties relating to asylum and how they are mirrored in domestic
law. It also includes a brief discussion on U.S. asylum law. Second, this note
examines the relationship between law and morality as it relates to asylum. It
discusses to what extent international legal commitments should bind
countries. Finally, this note demonstrates that our international legal
3. The qualifications for meeting the status of refugee and asylum status are the same. 8 U.S.C. §
II 58(b)( 1). Asylum status, however, may be terminated at the discretion of the Attorney General. Id §
1158(c)(2). When the statute refers to refugees who are admitted, it is referring to the overseas refugee
programs by which persons are granted protection by the United States before they enter the country. For
a general description of this program see THOMAS A. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION PROCESS AND
POLICY 735-57 (3d ed. 1995).
4. 8 U.S.C. § 157(aX5).
5. Id.
6. Myron Weiner, Ethics, National Sovereignty and the Control ofImmigration, 30 INT'L MIGRATION
REV. 171,172(1996).
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commitment precludes the numerical limitation contained in U.S. legislation
because it interferes with our obligation to place global concerns before
absolute sovereignty.
I. LEGAL PROVISIONS
A. International Treaties
Individual states traditionally have been the masters over asylum and
refugee status and have enjoyed unlimited sovereignty." After World War II,
the United Nations decided to make a commitment to displaced persons fleeing
political persecution.' The result of this commitment was the 1951 Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees.9 It provided for the protection of those in
Europe afraid of persecution as a result of events occurring before January 1,
1951.10 Because it recognized that the refugee problem was global and
enduring, the United Nations, in 1967, drafted a new international agreement
removing the time and location limitations of the 1951 Convention, but
otherwise adopted the same definition." This new treaty is called the 1967
United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refuges, and it defines a
refugee as follows:
[A person] owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group or political opinion, is outside the
7. Guy S. GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 101-02 (1983).
8. David A. Martin, Reforming Asylum Adjudication: On Navigating the Coast of Bohemia, 138 U.
PA. L. REv. 1247, 1254 (1990). "[The prior] framework shamed itself in the world's woefully inadequate
response in the 1930s and 1940s to those who were fleeing Nazi persecution." Id.
9. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter 1951
Convention].
10. Id. at art. 1, § A(2).
[Tihe term refugee shall apply to any person who: As a result of events
occurring before I January 1951 and owing to well-founded fear of being
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular
social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is
unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself to the protection of
that country. Id.
11. The United States did not sign the 1951 Convention but did sign the 1967 Protocol. See Martin,
supra note 8, at 1257 (explaining that, although the United States played a role in the 1951 Convention,
national political conflicts prevented the treaty from being ratified in the Senate).
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country of his nationality, and is unable or, owing to such
fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that
country.'"
The one right that refugee status confers to refugees against individual
countries under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol is non-
refoulment.'3 This means that a refugee cannot be returned to the place from
which he or she fled if he or she would be persecuted. Unlike asylum, non-
refoulment is a protection guaranteed to refugees.' Article 33 of the 1951
Convention states that:
No Contracting State shall expel or return (refouler) a refugee
in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where
his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social
group or political opinion.s
It is important to note that this provision does not exclude a country deporting
a refugee to a hospitable third country.' 6
One last provision relevant to this note that was adopted by the 1967
Protocol is Article 34. This provision states that, "[t]he Contracting States
shall as far as possible facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of
refugees."' 7 Although courts in the United States focus only on the provisional
nature of this article, 8 the 1967 Protocol makes it clear that states shall (not
shall try or may) facilitate assimilation and naturalization. Therefore, although
this provision may seem provisionary, one could easily read a mandate into the
plain language.
12. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, art. 1, § 2, 19 U.S.T. 6261, 606 U.N.T.S.
267 [hereinafter 1967 Protocol].
13. Some argue that, "[n]on-refoulment is a peremptory norm of international law and binds all states
regardless of whether they have signed the 1951 Convention or the 1967 Protocol." Yen Tran, The Closing
of the Saga of the Vietnamese Asylum Seekers: The Implications on International Refugees and Human
Rights Lavs, 17 Hous. J. INT'L L. 463, 508 (1995).
14. Id. See also Martin, supra note 8, at 1256.
15. 1951 Convention, supra note 9, at art. 33.
16. Id.
17. 1967 Protocol, supra note 12, at art. 34.
18. See, e.g., INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 428 (1984). "[T]he language of Article 34 was precatory
and not self-executing."
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None of these regulations establish a right to asylum; and despite
international treaties, state sovereignty remains strong in the area of refugee
and asylum law. 9 Individual contracting states are not required to follow any
procedure for determining what particular protection refugees should be
eligible for in each country, such as qualifying for asylum." In other words,
states do not have a defined international legal obligation to grant persons
asylum, even if they qualify under national standards.
B. The United States'Asylum Law
Individual countries, in attempts to follow the mandates of the 1967
Protocol," have voluntarily created asylum standards that mirror the
international standard for determining refugee status.2  There are three
procedures relevant to the 1967 Protocol in U.S. law: stay of deportation,23
refugee status,24 and asylum.25
Before the 1967 Protocol, the United States had a provision in its law that
provided refugee status for those from communist countries or the Middle
East.2 6 There was also a provision for a stay of deportation.2  This provision
was discretionary, meaning that persons had no rights against the
government. 8
In 1980, the United States changed the definition with the adoption of the
Refugee Act. This act changed three parts of the Immigration and Nationality
Act that are relevant to this note. First, it amended the definition of refugee so
that it came to mirror the definition in the Protocol's definition of refugee. 9
19. Id.
20. See generally OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON
PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS (2d. ed. 1992).
21. "The Contracting States shall as far as possible facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of the
refugees." 1951 Convention, supra note 9, at art. 34. See also Martin, supra note 8, at 1256. ("[S]ince 1951
most Western countries, to their credit, have set up asylum claims systems that essentially combine the
determination of refugee status under the 1951 Convention definition ....").
22. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. §1158. See also Martin, supra note 8, at 1259-66.
23. 8 U.S.C. §1253(h).
24. 8 U.S.C. §1157.
25.8 U.S.C. §1158.
26. 8 U.S.C. §1 153(a)(7)(A) (1970) (amended 1980).
27. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1964 ed.) (amended 1978).
28. Id.
29. "[A person outside his or her country] who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or
unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a
well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group or political opinion." 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(42XA). For an account of the U.S. enactment and how it
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Second, it created a standard for granting asylum based on the amended
definition of a refugee." This remained completely discretionary although,
prior to the IIRIRA, there was no upper numerical limitation. Finally, the stay
of deportation provision was amended. Stay of deportation became mandatory
rather than discretionary." However, the legal standard for determining who
qualified for a stay of deportation remained the same. 2
For some time commentators thought that, subsequent to the 1980
Refugee Act, there was no substantial difference between non-refoulment and
asylum. For example, in his article, Reforming Asylum Adjudication." On
Navigating the Coast of Bohemia, David A. Martin revealed the complexities
and ambiguities of the connection between asylum and non-refoulment. As
the system in nations has developed, asylum law "guarantees an individual
right of asylum to those who somehow establish physical presence on the soil
of such Western countries and also prove that they satisfy the 1951 Convention
definition."33  Therefore, commentators believed there had been an
amalgamation of the definitions of refugee and asylum causing difficulty in
distinguishing the right of non-refoulment from the discretionary granting of
asylum. 4
This, however, is not the case. The Supreme Court in the Stevic and
Cardoza-Fonseca line of cases cited the language of the statutes to conclude
that the stay of deportation provision contained a higher standard than
asylum." The stay of deportation provision states that a stay may only be
granted if a person "would face" persecution36 rather than if the person only
had a "well-founded fear" of persecution,37 the standard under asylum law and
the refugee definition.38 The Supreme Court in Stevic decided that the stay of
deportation required a "clear probability" (fifty-one percent chance) rather than
a reasonable belief.39
changed U.S. policy see Martin, supra note 8, at 1259-66.
30. 8 U.S.C. §1158. See also Martin, supra note 8, at 1259-66.
31. See 8 U.S.C. §1253(h).
32. Id. See generally INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 413-20 (explaining the history of deportation and
asylum standards).
33. Martin, supra note 8, at 1256.
34. Id
35. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,440-41 (1987).
36. 8 U.S.C. §1253(h).
37. 8 U.S.C. §1158.
38. See INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407,424-25.
39. Id.
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The Supreme Court argued that the difference between the asylum and
deportation standard was consistent with the 1967 Protocol because the
standard for non-refoulment requires that a "refugee ... would be" persecuted
and that asylum is discretionary.' The Court noted that the 1967 Protocol
defines refugee as a person with a well-founded fear of persecution4" but
nevertheless argued its way out of this contradiction.42
The Supreme Court concluded from the legislative history that the asylum
provision was drafted to comply with Article 34 of the 1967 Protocol, and that
the stay of deportation procedure was amended to better comply with Article
33*3 The Court maintained in Cardoza-Fonseca that U.S. law at the time of
the 1967 Protocol was already sufficient to meet the standards.4 However,
"[i]f one thing is clear from the legislative history of the new definition of
refugee and indeed the entire 1980 Act, it is that one of Congress' primary
purposes was to bring the United State's Refugee law into conformance with
the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees."' 5 Therefore, although
it is important that the provisions may have been aimed at different parts of the
treaty, it is reasonable to believe that the provisions were not directed solely
at one article of the treaty. In other words, the Court need not have interpreted
the provisions as narrowly as it did.
There are two other provisions in the U.S. law that facilitate compliance
with the 1967 Protocol. One is a procedure by which a person may be
deported to a third country. ' Even if this person were a refugee, it would not
violate a refugee's right of non-refoulment because non-refoulment only
prohibits sending back a refugee to a country in which he or she would fear
persecution.47 An additional section of the stay of deportation provision
provides that the Attorney General may grant a stay of deportation at her
discretion if she finds that there would be a violation of the 1967 Protocol.48
40. Id at 421-22.
41. Id at 422.
42. Id at 423-24.
43. Id. at 417.
44. Id
45. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,436.
46. See 8 U.S.C. §1253(a).
47. See, e.g., supra note 12 and accompanying text.
48. 8 U.S.C. §1253(hX3XB).
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2. New Development.- Asylum for Persecution for Coercive Family
Planning Policies."9
The IIRIRA amended the definition of the Immigration and Nationality
Act further, not to comply with a treaty provision, but to resolve a debate in
United States policy concerning China's family planning policies. There has
been much debate in the United States concerning China's family planning or
population control policies. The following is a general description of China's
policy:
In June of 1979, supporting nearly a quarter of the world's
population with less than eight percent of the world's
farmland, China adopted a population control policy. The
policy included a goal of zero growth by the turn of the
century. Confronted with mass starvation as well as
economic and social stagnation, the Chinese government
established a policy primarily focused on limiting each couple
to one child. The policy is enforced by a combination of
incentives and punishments. Asylum applicants often
complain of the most extreme punishments, namely forced
abortion or sterilization."
In addition to the debate concerning the merits of the family planning
policies and how they are enforced, there has also been indecisiveness about
whether to allow persons to claim asylum for persecution under population
control schemes." The Board of Immigration Appeals decided that coercive
family planning programs are a matter of policy and influenced by concerns
for population growth; therefore, persecution under these policies was not
grounds for asylum." Recently, the U.S. Congress passed amendments to the
49. This note does not discuss whether this should be a legitimate claim or not. For the purposes of
this note, I assume that it is, although this is not a representation one way or another about my beliefs. For
an article discussing whether this is a legitimate claim see, e.g., Charles E. Schulman, The Grant of Asylum
to Chinese Citizens Who Oppose China's One-Child Policy: A Policy of Persecution or Population
Control?, 16 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 313 (1996).
50. Id. at 316.
51. See, e.g., id. at 320-23 (discussing the history of asylum claims for persons claiming persecution
under China's family planning policies).
52. Matter of Chen, 20 I. & N. Dec. 16 (1989).
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Immigration Ac 3 allowing persons to be declared a refugee or claim asylum
for fear of persecution because of coercive family planning policies:
[A] person who has been forced to abort a pregnancy or to
undergo involuntary sterilization, or who has been persecuted
for failure or refusal to undergo such a procedure or for other
resistance to a coercive population control program shall be
deemed to have been persecuted on account of political
opinion, and a person who has a well founded fear that he or
she will be forced to undergo such a procedure or subject to
persecution for such failure, refusal, or resistance shall be
deemed to have a well founded fear of persecution on account
of political opinion.'
The amendment to the Immigration Act is aimed at China's practices" and
limits the number of persons who may be granted refugee or asylum' status
to one thousand:
[N]ot more than a total of 1,000 refugees may be admitted
under this subsection or granted asylum pursuant to a
determination under the third sentence of section 1101 (a)(42)
of this title (relating to persecution for resistance to coercive
population control methods)."'
Although legislative history shows that Congress expressed a concern for
the population control methods of China, Congress also showed concern that
53. 8 U.S.C. § I 101(aX42).
54. Id
55. In a House Report, Congress cited China's policies in support for the legislation that has overruled
previous decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals. "In the Peoples Republic of China, some women
with 'unauthorized' second or third pregnancies are subjected to involuntary abortions, often late in their
pregnancies. Both men and women who have met their quota for children may be forcibly sterilized." H.R.
REP. No. 104-96, pt. I (1996) [hereinafter H.R. REPORT].
56. "Political commentators also considered the order a response to domestic pressure to conform the
United States' foreign policy, if not its domestic law, to the views of anti-abortion groups." John D. Griffin,
The Chinese Student. Protection Act and 'Enhanced Consideration'for PRC Nationals: Legitimizing
Foreign Policy While Averting False Positives in Asylum Lmv, 66 U. COLO. L. REv, 1105, 1125 (1995).
57. 8 U.S.C. §1157(a).
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persons arriving on United States soil would doctor false claims based upon
coercion under family planning policies."8 However:
The Committee emphasizes that the burden of proof remains
on the applicant, as in every other case to establish by
credible evidence that he or she has been the subject of
persecution. The Committee is aware that asylum claims
based on coercive family planning are often made by entire
groups of smuggled aliens, thus suggesting that at least some
claims, if not the majority have been "coached". 9
If there were concerns that it was too easy for asylum seekers to prove
their claims, then Congress may have been able to increase the evidentiary
standard and declare that a person must prove that they are a refugee beyond
any reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court had already decided that asylum
claims were pursuant to Article 34 and were therefore only subject to a "as far
as practicable"' standard under the treaty.6 Rather than giving judges the
tools to help decide individual cases with more precision and thereby
providing for a higher probability of weeding out the false claims, Congress
instead decided to limit the numbers. Thus, it seems as if the importance has
shifted from distinguishing legitimate from illegitimate claims to limiting the
number of accepted claims. Although the United States traditionally limits the
number of refugee applicants it will accept from overseas' and the number of
persons it will allow to adjust from asylee or refugee status to permanent
resident status,63 it is unusual for the United States to limit the number of
applicants for one particular class of persecution.
D. Understanding the Relationship Between Legislation and Treaties
In order to analyze this legislation thoroughly, one must understand the
basic dynamic between legislation and treaties:
58. H.R. REPORT, supra note 55.
59. Id
60. INS v. Cordoza-Fonseca, 408 U.S. 421,439.
61. This paper is not advocating that this is a good choice or a proper choice in light of my current
thesis. I use this point to show the motivations behind the U.S. law and I am not advocating this particular
solution.
62. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101.
63. Id.
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By the Constitution laws made in pursuance thereof and
treaties made under the authority of the United States are both
declared to be the supreme law of the land and no paramount
authority is given to one over the other .... [T]he last
expression of the sovereign will must control.'
The last word of the sovereign is law. In addition, "[t]here is no power in this
Court to declare null and void a statute adopted by Congress or a declaration
included in a treaty merely on the ground that such provision violates a
principle of international law. 65 However, the Supreme Court does look to the
treaty to clarify provisions of United States law that mirror the treaty.66
The legislation concerning persons fleeing persecution for family planning
policies in China is unique because the law was enacted in pursuance of a
treaty obligation. 7 The later-in-time approach, meaning that any conflicts
between the IIRIRA or the INA and the Protocol would be resolved in favor
of the statute if it was subsequent to the treaty, does not make much sense as
this law is in pursuance of the Protocol. Thus, it is only logical that the Court
in the Chinese Exclusion Case may not have intended to create an unbendable
rule that subsequent legislation would overrule treaty commitments. In Tag
v. Rogers, the D.C. Circuit expressed a concern that the last statement of the
sovereign and the intent of the sovereign should be considered when deciding
if legislation trumps a provision in a treaty: "[i]f the treaty operates by its own
force, and relates to a subject within the power of Congress, it can be deemed
in that particular case only the equivalent of a legislative act, to be repealed or
modified at the pleasure of Congress."
However, this interpretation is squarely contrary to current statutory
interpretation with regard to treaties regarding the 1967 Protocol. "The
language in section 208(a) specifying the discretionary nature of asylum relief
is clear, and since that section was enacted subsequent to the 1967 Protocol it
controls over any conflicting language in the protocol under the applicable
rules of statutory interpretation."
64. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 627-28 (1889) (hereinafter Chinese Exclusion
Case).
65. Tag v. Rogers, 267 F.2d 664, 666 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
66. See, e.g., Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993).
67. Id.
68. Tag, 267 F.2d at 668 n.12 (emphasis added).
69. Matter of Salim, 181 & N Dec. 311,314.
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Both immigration and asylum are deemed to be within the power of
Congress. With this law, however, there should be a strong presumption that
Congress did not wish to repeal any part of its obligation under the treaty
because the law as well as the amendments to the law are made in furtherance
and under the direction of the treaty. In other words, the United States
voluntarily made this commitment and should be held to it. Therefore, the
interpretation of the treaty should control subsequent legislation.
The reality is, however, that the Supreme Court arguably has taken a
narrow approach to treaty interpretation to preserve state sovereignty:
According to past concepts of state sovereignty and to
contemporary views regarding the undertaking of
international obligations, international agreements were to be
strictly construed. Limitations on the sovereignty of states
were not to be presumed. In cases of doubt or ambiguity,
international agreements were to be interpreted to preserve a
state's maximum freedom of action. There is even authority
supporting the view that the presumption against the
derogation of sovereignty may be applied more stringently
when a national court ... is faced with a question of treaty
interpretation. From this point of view, the Supreme Court in
[recent] cases ... is following a well established and time-
sanctioned tradition of interpretation of international
agreements. United States courts, however, have traditionally
not taken a restrictive approach, but rather have liberally
construed United States treaty obligations. Thus, the
[Supreme] Court's recent trend toward restrictive
interpretation of treaties is a disturbing innovation in
American jurisprudence."'
This trend may be more disturbing in the area of refugee law because states
already maintain a great deal of sovereignty by setting numerical limitations
on refugees.
70. Martin A. Rogoff, Interpretation of International Agreements by Domestic Courts and the Politics
of International Treaty Relations: Reflections on Some Recent Decisions of the United States Supreme
Court, I I AM. U.J. INV'L L. & POL'Y 559, 564-66 (1996).
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II. MORAL OBLIGATIONS AND GLOBAL COMMITTMENTS
To determine if this law is a legal way to limit asylum, it is necessary to
discuss the nature of the respective nations' commitments. Asylum law speaks
about morality7 in a very direct and meaningful way.' In addition, in order
to comply with the treaty, nations have enacted laws that grant more protection
than does the treaty. This places refugee and asylum law beyond the strict
confines of legal analysis and also requires a "moral analysis". To state it less
dramatically, an analysis of the type of commitment that nations have toward
the treaty provisions concerning asylum is appropriate.
There are two alternatives that may determine how nations respond when
they have made international and domestic commitments. I have labeled them
cursory and visionary commitments. I will first describe these two
commitments. Second, I will discuss the benefits to adopting a visionary
commitment, at least in the area of asylum.
A. Cursory Commitments
The first type of commitment of a nation to an international document is
a cursory commitment. It describes a commitment that is expressed in the
words of the law alone. Once a nation complies with the words, the
commitment has been met. It does not require any consideration of the
international sentiment with regard to the morality of the adopted policies.
Considering the case of asylum, countries may adopt the regulations and then
feel that their obligations to international and global commitments are
satisfied.
One example of this type of commitment is the United States' response to
Haitian boat immigrants.73 The United States has adopted a policy of turning
71. This is not to say that there are no serious moral flaws with the 1951 Convention. First, it
emphasized a Western point of view to the exclusion of granting asylum for violations .of socioeconomic
rights. Second, it only addressed events before 1951, until the adoption of the 1967 Protocol. Martin, supra
note 8, at 1338-65. Third, it overlooks that "wars and natural disasters frequently mask political
persecution." Frederick B. Baer, International Refugees as Political Weapons, 37 HARV. INT'L L.J. 243
(1996).
72. "[T]he United Nations has, on various occasions, manifested its profound concern for refugees and
endeavored to assure refugees the widest possible exercise of these fundamental rights and freedoms ... 
1951 Convention, supra note 9, at I (Preamble).
73. See generally Terry Coonan, America Adrift: Refoulmeni on the High Seas, 63 U. CN. L. REv.
1241 (1995) (discussing Haitian refugees and how interdiction in the water violates the 1967 Protocol).
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the asylum seekers away before they enter U.S. territory. Preventing the
refugees from landing on U.S. territory may not violate our technical
obligation toward non-refoulment because one cannot technically send the
refugees out of the country and back to where they may be persecuted if they
are never allowed to land.
The Supreme Court recently discussed this issue in Sale v. Haitian Centers
Council, Inc.74 A group of Haitians seeking refuge in the United States by boat
were turned away before they reached national waters.7" This policy was
challenged as a violation of the non-refoulment provision. The Court held that
it did not violate non-refoulment because a nation cannot refouler someone
who never enters the country. In other words, the treaty "cannot impose
uncontemplated extraterritorial obligations on those who ratify it.... "76 Some
have criticized the United States for taking a "narrow, some would say
hypertechnical view of its international obligations in order to forestall mass
attempts at immigration.. .[and by doing so] the United States has avoided the
spirit, if not the letter, of non-refoulment.""
The Court did look toward the 1967 Protocol and the 1951 Convention for
clues about the meaning of refouler.9 However, it did not go beyond that to
consider, as Blackmun did in his dissent, that we made a commitment not to
"return [refouler] a refugee in any manner whatsoever" to a place where he
would face political persecution.' The Court was determined to read the treaty
narrowly and stated explicitly that:
The drafters of the Convention and the parties to the
Protocol--like the drafters of § 243(h)-may not have
contemplated that any nation would gather fleeing refugees
and return them to the one country they had desperately
sought to escape; such actions may even violate the spirit of
Article 33; but a treaty cannot impose uncontemplated
extraterritorial obligations on those who ratify it through no
more than its general humanitarian intent.'
74. See Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993).
75. Id. at 166-67
76. Id at 183.
77. Michael J. Churgin, Mass Exoduses: The Response of the United States, 30 INT'L MIGRATION REv.
310(1996).
78. Sale, 509 U.S. at 180-81.
79. Id. at 188-89 (Blackmun dissenting).
80. Id. at 183.
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The result of this is a shifting of the moral paradigm." The real and deeply
pondered questions about asylum policy concern the moral ramifications as
perceived by and affecting the individual nation rather than the international
community. As Blackmun noted in his dissent in Sale, "the Court relies almost
entirely on the fact that American law makes a general distinction between
deportation and exclusion."82 The IIRIRA conducts a similar feat. This is not
to say that Congress ignored moral concerns when reforming the Immigration
Act. The moral issues, however, mostly concerned our own nation. There is
a concern with the ability of immigration judges to distinguish true from false
claims. Congress also showed foreign policy concerns."3 Congress, granted,
may have also had concerns about human rights violations." This explains the
expansion of grounds for asylum but does little to explain the numerical
limitation. 5 In short, there is no indication in the legislative history as to any
thought about our international commitments.
B. Visionary Commitments
The second commitment is what I have labeled a visionary commitment.
Obligations are not met when we merely adopt moral language and analyze it
within our own national moral paradigm. Obligations are only met when the
intent of our collective vision is consistent with our policy. Here, I believe it
is helpful to draw on an analysis put forth by Sanford Levinson in his book
Constitutional Faith.' Although it is clear by the title of his book that he is
discussing constitutional interpretation, his book also focuses on how morality
and law are related. He postulates that from an alien, or outside perspective,
law is distinguishable from moral commands. In his view, there is knowledge
that the protocol is about morality, but morality is discussed most when it
concerns the United States' perspective. However, when the moral perspective
81. It is interesting to note that the United States' own Refugee Act was a reflection on its tradition
in responding to refugees. The purpose of the Act states that it is the policy of the United States to protect
refugees. Griffin, supra note 56, at 1147.
82. Sale, 509 U.S. at 191 (emphasis added).
83. It is useful to note that foreign policy concerns do transcend national boundaries in that they deal
with the relationship between two countries. It necessarily implies global or international concerns,
especially as foreign policy is often conducted with a nation's own best interests at heart.
84. H.R. REPORT, supra note 55.
85. 8 C.F.R. § 207 (1997).
86. SANFORD LEvINsoN, CONSTrTTONAL FArm (1988)
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concerns the global community, it is boiled away and all that remains are legal
provisions. 7 However, borrowing Levinson's observation:
As we move to a perspective inside our own culture and, in
particular, take some responsibility for defining that culture,
including its legal element, the separation makes less and less
sense. To adopt the same kind of detached perspective that is
suitable to analysis of a foreign society would (by definition)
be to alienate ourselves from our own."
Although the United States is amending its own laws with the IIRIRA, the
fact that the initial law was in pursuance of a treaty is an acknowledgment of
global society and that the United States has become a greater part of it.
Furthermore, the fact that the treaty recognizes that international cooperation
is required to alleviate refugee problems also defines a global community. If
it is our goal to deny that we are in a global community, it is too late. The
United States has already become connected to it by this treaty. Given the
barriers of language and culture, the words may not always clearly express the
exact intent of the global community."9 It is not always realistic to expect
states to allow global policy to control their own powers. A discussion of
when our international commitments should limit our asylum policy is the
subject of the next section.
III. MORAL COMMITMENTS AS FORMULATING A LEGAL LIMIT TO NATIONAL
SOVEREIGNTY IN ASYLUM CASES
Determining to what degree our visionary commitment should limit our
legislative powers is a difficult task. It would be a rare occurrence indeed that
nations would sign an international commitment and with the same stroke of
the pen sign away control and sovereignty.' The reality today is that "issues
87. See, e.g., Sale, 509 U.S. 155.
88. LEvINSON, supra note 86, at 74-75.
89. See, e.g., Sale, 509 U.S. at 155 (discussing the different meanings of refouler).
90. C.S. Milligan stated three principles in refugee law that combine ethics and political realities:
I. A nation has the right as well as the need to regulate immigration....
2. Politicians and administrations make administrative decisions and will bring
their own moral principles to bear on their judgements.
3. People become refugees for a variety of reasons ... wanting to improve one's
life is not enough reason to apply for refugee status. W. GUNTHER PLAUT,
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of international migration remain largely in the province of state discretion,
including issues even pertaining to refugees despite the articulation of
international standards and the existence of international institutions concerned
with the subject."9'
I postulate that legal obligations follow when a nation makes an
affirmative commitment to asylum seekers in pursuance of a treaty obligation.
It is irrelevant that the asylum statute gives more benefits than simply that of
non-refoulment.1 The other alternative, stay of detention,93 does not comply
with the mandate in Article 34 which states that "contracting states shall as far
as possible facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of the refugees."
Under a cursory commitment, "as far as possible" may be interpreted as simply
a matter for the state to decide. Considering that we have voluntarily come
into a community in which we acknowledge that intergovernmental
cooperation is necessary," I propose that the United States view its
commitments as visionary. This would, at the very least, preclude the United
States from attempting to limit the number of persons using methods that
"violate the spirit" of the treaty with no justification due to concerns for the
national welfare.
States may determine the numbers of persons that come into their
territory.1 The 1967 Protocol did not specify a minimum number of refugees
that countries were required to accept. The global community does not have
the ability at this time to tread upon this sovereignty. A country's resources
and its capability of taking on new persons who have gained asylum is one that
the individual country can best estimate. In addition, allowing this would give
disincentives for the countries to sign the treaty at all and would give states
incentives to set a low number for the overall number of refugees it will select.
ASYLUM: A MORAL DECISION 54-55 (1995).
9 1. Arthur Helton, The Role of the Internationl Law in the Twenty-First Century: Forced International
Migration: A Need for New Approaches by the International Community, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1623,
1627 (1995).
92. Martin argues "[t]hat these admirable features of the system [that countries have created asylum
provisions] go beyond the strict requirements of international law, however, should remind us of their
fragility. They cannot be taken as inevitable constants. Instead it must be an ever-present concern of wise
policy to shape asylum measures, including adjudication systems, so as to maximize continued domestic
support. The systems' inability to cope effectively with growing numbers of asylum seekers over the last
decade now threatens that foundation." Martin, supra note 8, at 1257.
93. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.14 (1997).
94. 1951 Convention, supra note 9, at art. 34.
95. Id at I (Preamble).
96. For example, the U.S. President determines the number of refugees allowed into the United States.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1157; 8 C.F.R. § 207.1.
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The IIRIRA legislation is different because it sets a limit on a very
particular group of asylum seekers. In addition, it limits the number it will
allow in, not out of a concern for our national resources, but rather because
Congress believes that there will be false claims.' Preventing false claims is
a legitimate state interest, however, the legislation has very little to do with
protecting our national interests. It does not attempt to limit the false claims
for other groups of asylum seekers, just this one group. In addition, the law
does not require a change in the evidentiary standards98 and it seems that if an
applicant is number 1,005, even with a highly credible claim, he or she is
denied refugee or asylum status.
If the person is denied asylum status, they move to deportation
proceedings. The technical obligation of non-refoulment may be met.' The
treaty, however, does not envision states essentially leaving a refugee stranded
after a State has made a moral commitment. Article 34 of the Convention
states that: "Contracting States shall as far as possible facilitate the
assimilation and naturalization of refugees. They shall in particular make
every effort to expedite naturalization proceedings and to reduce as far as
possible the charges and costs of such proceedings."'" Rather than simply
taking a "last in time approach"'' and justifying this by claiming that our law
meets the treaty requirements we need to think of solutions to limiting the
number of asylum claims that is consistent with both the treaty obligation and
at the same time recognize state sovereignty and concerns of false asylum
claims. The solution may be as simple as limiting the number of asylum
claims generally or changing the procedures to ensure more accuracy in the
adjudication.
In enacting the IIRIRA, the legislature ignored moral obligations and
failed to exhibit a visionary commitment to the goals of the international
community. The result is unfair. For example, it is unfair to announce a new
ground for asylum and then deny adjudication of the refugees' claims for
asylum on that ground. It is unfair to purport to make a new specific moral
commitment to a class of individuals when the overiding concerns were our
own laws and policies. Given that state sovereignty is not threatened by the
97. H.R. REPORT, supra note 55.
98. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.13.
99. Seeid. § 208.16.
100. 1951 Convention, supra note 9, at art. 34.
101. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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IIRIRA, it is only just that the United States be consistent with its voluntary
global obligations.

